Bosnia, a linchpin of allied defence planning in the 1990s, has in the following decade now become a matter of strategic concern because of its role in the war on terror.  Its position in counterterror is pressing due to the conjunction between Bosnia's legacy of war (with inflamed religious sentiment and clandestine networks banished to Bosnia's margins but not eradicated), Bosnia's position on the doorstep of Europe, and the connections formed during the Bosnian War between Bosnian territory and religiously-based clandestine movements abroad.  The presence of terrorist networks in Bosnia is still further troubling because of their potential to magnify other causes of instability, through involvement in organised crime, gun smuggling, extortion, and racketeering. 

 

Bosnia has proven an important, and largely successful, ground of contest for allied and European counterterror efforts.  Since the end of the war, roughly seven hundred militants from the Middle East and Maghreb have remained or taken up residence in Bosnia, along with a number of questionable charities with links to international terrorist networks.  Many of the foreign mujahideen have married and settled in remote areas.  In October 2001, Bosnian police arrested and deported to the United States six Algerian nationals under suspicion of plotting to attack the American embassy.  Police raids in 2002 uncovered, amongst other indications of clandestine activity, forged passports, explosives and firearms, and several letters from Osama bin Laden.  In the past year, Bosnian territory has become a refuge, recruiting source, and financial conduit for a flow of terrorist operatives moving between Chechnya, Afghanistan, Europe, and Iraq.  Finally, the intense pace of US and European intelligence operations in Bosnia - Bosnia constitutes one of the largest deployments by US intelligence anywhere in the world -  have raised criticisms of the United States in the local press for bypassing the nation's courts and legal system, as well as for neglecting war criminals.  On the other hand, grounds for optimism include the considerable cooperation Bosnian officials have extended SFOR in monitoring and investigating terrorist networks and suspected foreign operatives.  Furthermore, the preponderance of Bosnia's Islamic community follow the moderate Hanafi tradition of Southeastern Europe, and Bosnian Muslim leaders such as Grand Mufti Dr Mustafa Ceric have won international praise for their efforts to promote religious reconciliation.  Nonetheless, radical religious elements are attempting as a high priority to build upon their foothold in Bosnia's margins, and the role of counterterror operations in providing stability in the nation will continue to be an important function under EUFOR.

 

In spite of its importance, Bosnian terrorism has been minimally addressed in the policy debate outside governments.  This chapter will address policy questions relevant to Bosnian terrorism and counterterror operations, against the context of the pending transition of control from the Nato-directed SFOR to the European-directed EUFOR.  The chapter's task will be to gauge progress in counterterror as well as trends amongst terrorist networks, and to draw the attention of European and Allied policymakers to neglected operational and doctrinal differences in their counterterrorism efforts to facilitate as effective a handover and prosecution of counterterrorism under European control as possible.  This piece's five principal substantive contributions will be:

 

1. a summary of principal terrorist organisations within BiH and their domestic, international, and ideological contexts.

2. a review of the history of counterterror operations within BiH and their evolution in connection with enhanced counterterror operations since 2001, as well as relevant SFOR lessons learned which may prove most useful for EUFOR planners.

3. in the context of the SFOR-EUFOR handover, an investigation of doctrinal and operational counterterror differences between Nato and ESDP which may prove useful to highlight for both partners

4. a discussion of the role of counterterrorism, intelligence, and Ministry of the Interior responsibilities within a broader and paramount Bosnian security sector reform agenda, in which key other issues include unification of the General Staff and creation of an MoD within which to place the newly appointed Defence Minister

5. an enquiry into the line between military and policing: since the EU will also be co-ordinating Bosnia's police operation, will cooperation between military and police be enhanced by co-ordinated European control, or conversely are there operational or doctrinal differences between uniformed and civilian units which ought to be highlighted? In their division of responsibilities, will the EU military forces see more areas as police responsibilities where Nato might have achieved less co-operation with the police?  Further handover-related questions lie in whether a continued Nato role will result from a continued Nato presence tasked with the tracking and capture of war criminals, and if so, how this role will coexist with EUFOR.

 

Principal sources for this research lie in interviews with a series of fairly well-placed practitioners and experts:

 

Rohan Gunaratna, author

Gen Graham Messervy-Whiting, former deputy chief of EU military staff, expert on ESDP and Nato, and for current contacts in Brussels

Gen Drewienkiewicz (through ICG Sarajevo), military advisor for High Rep. Paddy Ashdown and director of Security Cooperation at OSCE Mission, principal expert in EUFOR mission preparation

Col Michael Ryan, DOD Advisor, USEU (through Leo Michel and Jim Schear at Nat'l Defence University)

Lt Col Tommy Tracy,  expert on the SFOR-EUFOR handover (through Grame Herd)

Dr James Pettifer, expert on Bosnian terrorism at CSRC, Defence Academy UK (also through Dr Herd)

Adm Jean Dufourcq (through Jeremy Shapiro, CSIS), French representative to the EU military staff

Nora Bensahel, RAND, expert on Nato counterterror doctrine and Nato-EU relations

Jim Ron, McGill University, researcher on Bosnian paramilitary groups

Ed Joseph, ICG Balkan counterterror expert (through Fran Burwell, Atlantic Council)

Dick Nelson, former Nato counterterror expert at Atlantic Council

Maida Agovic, Cambridge, whose dissertation on Bosnia between Washington and Brussels includes the war on terror

Drs Jeff Simon and Steve Meyers at Nat'l Defence Uni, researchers on Nato and Bosnia

Mike Sheehan, former State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism (through James Steinberg, Brookings)

Cees Wiebes, author of Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992-1995

Jim O'Brien (via Julianne Smith, CSIS), Albright Group

Gen Montgomery Meigs (through Ted Gittinger, Univ. of Texas)

Gen Bill Nash (via Mike Peters, CFR)

Background interviews in intelligence community (through former DCI James Woolsey and other sources)

 

I have also been receiving suggestions and advice in this research from:

 

Jeremy Shapiro and James Steinberg (Brookings)

Anne Moisan, Chris Cavoli, Leo Michel, and James Schear (National Defence University)

Roy Giles (St Antony's College, Oxford, and retired British intelligence)

Julianne Smith (deputy director of international security programme, CSIS)

Sir Brian Crowe

Capt. Keith Allred, USN, Associate Dean, Marshall Centre

Nermin Mulalic

Robin Bhatty, International Crisis Group

Senad Slatina, ICG Sarajevo

James Goldgeier (George Washington University)

Fran Burwell (Director, program on transatlantic relations, Atlantic council)

Brendan Simms (Cambridge)

Melanie McDonagh (journalist)