

Chapter 4: Analysis and Conclusions

Abstract: This section reports preliminary results, with more exhaustive analysis envisaged when data from the second case are at hand in the future. The analysis takes the form of correlations, comparison of directionality with predictions made by the models for each indicator, and preliminary regressions to gauge significance of the models. A number of provocative results are noted, and among models, the first-mover and political resource models stand as most promising, though several indicators from the others emerge quite strongly, too. Models are on this basis assessed, and next directions upcoming for this research are described.

1. Introduction

All that remains then is to make use of the information gathered in the preceding case in order to assess the four models for their comparative explanatory power. Forthcoming drafts of this chapter will incorporate a broader range of statistical analyses, but for present purposes, provocative results may nonetheless be derived from more straightforward analysis consisting of partial correlations and multiple regressions. At several points, where appropriate, it is noted where results are preliminary.

The seven episodes drawn from the China case permit six degrees of freedom, with a subsequent loss of one degree for each variable tested. Adding the Russia case to this analysis, with its eight contemplated episodes, will then expand the number of degrees of freedom to fourteen, and nine remaining for the error term.¹

2. Relative predictive strengths of independent variables

The chart which follows summarises results by graphing the comparative predictive value of the indicators of each independent variable proposed. As regards awards of correlative strength, there are three independent variables which correlate quite strongly with the dependent variable, and with Pearson coefficients (r^2) of greater than 0.35: these are the presence or absence of a military component, initiative and the gap between presidential approval and disapproval on foreign policy, with r^2 strengths of 0.525, 0.347 and 0.466, respectively. With intermediate ranges of correlation we have proximate elections (0.316), issue type (0.275) and tempo (0.222), the margin of control in the Senate (0.197), and down a bit, congressional approval (0.188) and the gap between congressional approval and disapproval showings (0.159). Showing minimal importance, interestingly, are measures of generalised presidential approval, increments in the defence budget (either absolute or relative to gnp), the House margin, and ideological heterogeneity in the Senate majority. (The corresponding indicator for the House majority correlated more strongly, at 0.124.) Whether government is divided or not and how severely shows up as fairly weak as well, indicating, perhaps, that presidents can expect as firm opposition from congresses dominated by their copartisans as their political opponents.

¹ I am indebted to Dr Francis Marriott of the Department of Statistics for his kind help with several aspects of this statistical analysis. Any errors remain my own.

Tiananmen	6/89 to 1/90	70.5	53.375	63	10.4029851
MFN	6/90 to 5/94	54.9361702	12.375	54.3636364	8.3342379
Visa for Lee	May-95	51	7	40	-11
Harry Wu	6/95-7/95	47.5	10.5	42	-5.5
Straits	Mar-96	54	9	49	4
TSEA	2/00 to 4/00	62.6666667	3.6666667	51	11
PNTR	3/00 to 5/00	60.6666667	4.6666667	51	11
R		-0.2151465	0.33158259	-0.3119872	-0.6826437
r ²		0.04628803	0.10994701	0.09733603	0.46600238

Correlation with strength of Congress indicators I

Episode	Congress approval	Congress approval-disapproval	Unity of House Majority	Unity of Sen majority	Unity of both majorities
Tiananmen	24	-44	86	80.5	83.25
MFN	24	-44	87	84	85.5
Visa for Lee	34	-23	93	91	92
Harry Wu	35	-20	93	91	92
Straits	35	-22	90	91	90.5
TSEA	51	9	90	90	90
PNTR	39	-13	90	91	90.5
R	-0.4330395	-0.3988432	0.35276684	-0.0410338	0.11316517
r ²	0.18752317	0.15907586	0.12444444	0.00168377	0.01280636

Strength of the Congress II

Episode	House margin	Sen margin	Joint con margin	Divided government index
Tiananmen	9.89	5.00	0.14885057	3
MFN	10.27	6.00	0.16268199	1.8
Visa for Lee	2.99	2	4.99	3
Harry Wu	2.99	2	4.99	3
Straits	4.6	4	8.6	3
TSEA	1.15	5	6.15	3
PNTR	1.15	5	6.15	3
R	0.14357172	-0.443745	-0.2206575	0.31180478

r ²	0.02061284	0.1969096	0.04868973	0.09722222
----------------	------------	-----------	------------	------------

Indicators of risk in international system, and in opposing president				
Episode	increment in def budget	Inc in def budget rel to gnp	Time to proximate election ²	Likelihood of force ³
Tiananmen	-1.3	3.1	10	0
MFN	-5.14	4.62	6	0
Visa for Lee	-0.9	3.7	18	0
Harry Wu	-0.9	3.7	4	0
Straits	-2.2	3.5	8	1
TSEA	1.4	3	7	1
PNTR	1.4	3	6	0
R	0.0283891	0.01636128	0.56197	-0.7245688
r ²	0.00080594	0.00026769	0.316	0.525

As results presented to this point have solely concerned strength of correlation, now taking account of directionality permits a two-fold comparison with predictions from each model.

Model 1: Predictions of first-mover model for indicator:

Assignment of first mover status:
 Prediction: *Negative correlation with IV*
 Result: Negative correlation with IV (-.59)

Model score: 1/1

Model 2: Predictors of issue area model for indicators:

Assignment of substantive issue area:
 Prediction: *Negative correlation with IV*
 Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.52)

Assignment of policy tempo:
 Prediction: *Negative correlation with IV*
 Result: Positive correlation with IV (0.22)

Model score: 1/2

Model 3: Predictions of political resources model for indicators:

Public approval of president:

² Calculated in months. Elections are held in November of even years, so the results are therefore given by 11/90- 1/90, 11/94-5/94, 11/96-5/95, 11/96-7/95, 11/96-3/96, 11/00-4/00, and 11/00-5/00.

³ Coded here as presence or absence of military manoeuvre, in dummy variable.

Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.22)
Public approval of Congress: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.43)
Public approval of president, specific to foreign policy: Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.31)
Presidential (approval less disapproval): Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Positive correlation with IV (0.33)
Presidential foreign policy (approval less disapproval): Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.68)
Ideological homogeneity of House majority: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: Positive correlation with IV (0.35)
Ideological homogeneity of Senate majority: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: No correlation (-0.04)
Divided government: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV⁴</i> Result: Positive correlation (0.31)
Model score: 5/8

Model 4: Predictions of political risk model for indicators:

Proximity of nearest election: Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Positive correlation (0.32)
House margin: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: No correlation (0.02)
Senate margin: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.44)
Joint congressional margin: Prediction: <i>Positive correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation with IV (-0.22)
Increase in defence budget: Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: No correlation (0.03)

⁴ i.e., though tangential to the model, the assumption here is that in a situation of divided government, Congress will be more likely to be assertive and deploy its other political endowments.

Increase in defence budget as percentage of GNP: Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: No correlation (0.02)
Likelihood of use of force: Prediction: <i>Negative correlation with IV</i> Result: Negative correlation (-0.53)
Model score: 1/7

The first model, first-mover advantage, performs quite well here, with correlation in the expected direction and with a high coefficient (-.59). In the second model, of issue area and tempo, substantive issue area also performs strongly and in the expected direction (-0.52), although policy tempo varies in the opposite direction than hypothesised. The political resources was in the present methodology most vulnerable to testing, and perhaps on that account performed best overall, with five of eight indicators covarying with the dependent variable in the hypothesised direction. Presidential foreign policy approval less disapproval proved a particularly strong correlation (-0.68), and stands therefore as a noteworthy result.

The results also provide several interesting surprises. Proximity to the nearest election is a strong correlate, but in the opposite direction than hypothesised by the literature to this point. If borne out by the Russia case, then it may well be the case that Congressional leaders view foreign policy assertiveness as an electoral resource, and not as a risk. Congress was also more likely to challenge a president who was popular⁵, while less likely to challenge one whose foreign policy enjoyed popular support.

It is also pleasant in political science to have unequivocal answers, and this research has produced at least one such result: namely, increments in the defence budget do not predict congressional assertiveness, at all. However, the strong performance of the use-of-force indicator suggests that the political risk model is not roundly falsified.

4. Regression analysis

Now using regression analysis to assess the significance of the relationships hypothesised by each model, we arrive at the following results.

Significance of each model			
	Pearson r^2	Chisquare	Prob > ChiSquare
Model 1: Initiative	0.3472	4.167	0.0412
Model 2: Issue Area	0.9583	11.5	0.0215
Model 3: Resources	0.8954	10.74	0.0567
Model 4: Risk	0.7798	9.357	0.0528

⁵ approval minus disapproval

Models performed reasonably well, with two of them enjoying model significance under 0.05: issue area (0.0215) and initiative (0.0412). The issue area model produces the highest confidence, though rather high r^2 results might suggest the usefulness of further examination of statistical specification. These results are therefore reported as preliminary.

Also, chi squares may be reported for indicators within each model.

Indicator of first mover				
	Deviance	Df	Chisquare	Prob>ChiSquare
Initiative	4.167	1	4.167	0.0412

Indicators of issue area				
Effect	Deviance	df	Chisquare	Prob>ChiSquare
Issue type	4.167	2	4.167	0.1245
Issue tempo	4.667	2	4.667	0.097

Indicators of political resources				
Effect	Deviance	df	Chisquare	Prob>ChiSquare
Pres approval-disapproval	0.1601	1	0.1601	0.6891
Pres fp approval-disapproval	1.669	1	1.669	0.1964
Unity of House	2.457	1	2.457	0.117
Unity of Senate	0.2265	1	0.2265	0.6342
Cong app-dis	2.198	1	2.198	0.1382

Indicators of political risk				
Effect	Deviance	df	Chisquare	Prob>ChiSquare
use of force	5.455	1	5.455	0.0195
months to election	2.442	1	2.442	0.1181
Inc in def budget rel to gnp	0.132	1	0.132	0.7164
Increment in def budget	3.52E-03	1	3.52E-03	0.9527

5. Comparative assessment of models

While by no means the only useful route for scholarship, the benefits of the Baconian approach in theoretically elaborating, operationalising, and testing hypotheses which had been heretofore only casually rendered in the literature are evident. This process has generated a number of surprising and intriguing results, including quite strong performances of several indicators and negligible ones by others, and conspicuously, the observation that some indicators, notably distance to the proximate election, not only

proved strong but induced variance in a wholly opposite direction to that hypothesised by prior research. The trumping role of public disfavour for the president's foreign policy in determining the extent of congressional success in shaping American foreign policy is pronounced and deserves further study and elaboration. Each model also emerges well enough to warrant future attention. These results will be expanded upon once data from the Russia case become available, until which time they must stand as preliminary but nonetheless provocative.

6. Next steps contemplated for this research

Four principal future directions are contemplated for the present research. These are: (1) the models will be more precisely rendered operational, with an effort to incorporate additional indicators and, by extension, predictions for each; (2) the statistical analysis will be extended and reworked in search of greater accuracy; (3) formal models shall be constructed for the four models, along lines hinted at in the text; (4) the Russia case shall be added, and additional interviews incorporated to supplement the China case. Further, somewhat more tangentially but in the interests of thoroughness, (5) an analysis will be added comparing the legislative-executive models of US action, singly and cumulatively, with prevailing realist models for predicting American policy choice in each episode.

This is therefore only the end of the beginning, but, as notes the Virgilian phrase depicted on the seal of the nation whose politics are herein considered, *annuit coeptis*.⁶

⁶ 'Iuppiter omnipotens, audacibus adnue coeptis,' adapting the *Aeneid*, IX, 625.

APPENDED NOTE, regarding Chinese romanisation

Balancing the twin risks of pedanticism and haphazardness, this essay has adopted *pinyin* as the current prevailing international standard⁷ for romanisation of Chinese proper names. In several instances, the earlier Wade-Giles romanised form of several persons are more familiar. Since the correspondence between the two romanisations is in most cases intuitive, rather than switching haphazardly between the two, *pinyin* has here been used throughout, with this table serving to indicate the correspondence with names which may be more familiar in Wade-Giles.

Juxtaposition of Pinyin and Wade-Giles Romanisations for Proper Names Which Occur in the Text	
<i>Pinyin</i>	<i>Wade-Giles</i>
Chén Shu_bì_n	Chen Shui-bian
Dèng Xiopíng	Deng Xiaoping
Fújiàn	Fu-chien
G_o xióng	Kaohsiung
Ji_ng Zemin	Jiang Zemin
Jílóng	Chi-lung
L_ D_nghu_	Lee Teng-hui
Ti_n'_nmén	Tiananmen
Zhèji_ng	Che-chiang

⁷ International Organisation for Standardisation, 1979.